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JN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OFUTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 990374-CA 
vs. : 
Priority No. 2 
ENRIQUE CORIA, : 
Defendant/ Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from his sentencing for conviction of solicitation to commit 
murder, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-203 (1999). 
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Issue: Did the trial court act within its discretion in ordering defendant's 
sentence for solicitation to commit murder to run consecutively to his sentence for a 
previous murder? 
Standard of Review: A sentence will not be disturbed unless it exceeds that 
permitted by law or the trial court has abused its discretion. State v. Shelby, 728 P.2d 
1 
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987, 988 (Utah 1986). An appellate court finds an abuse of discretion only if "'no 
reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the trial court.'" State v. 
Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649, 651 (Utah 1997) (quoting State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 
887 (Utah 1978)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (Supp. 1998) provides as follows: 
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of 
more than one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or 
consecutive sentences for the offenses. Sentences for state offenses shall 
run concurrently unless the court states in the sentence that they shall run 
consecutively. 
(2) The court shall order that sentences for state offenses run 
consecutively if the later offense is committed while the defendant is 
imprisoned or on parole unless the court finds and states on the record 
that consecutive sentencing would be inappropriate. 
* # # 
(4) A court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses 
and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant in 
determining whether to impose consecutive sentences. 
# * # 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On March 20, 1998, defendant was charged with solicitation to commit 
aggravated murder, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-203 
(1999) (R.l). On December 17, 1999, defendant entered a guilty plea to a reduced 
charge of solicitation to commit murder, a second degree felony in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-4-203 (1999) (R.63-66). On March 25, 1999, the court sentenced 
defendant to a term of 1-15 years for the second degree solicitation and ordered the 
2 
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sentence to run consecutively to the murder sentence he was then serving (R.12). 
Defendant timely appealed (R.77). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
While incarcerated pending trial on a homicide charge, defendant solicited 
another inmate to murder a key witness in defendant's murder case for $1,000. 
Defendant was arrested on a criminal homicide charge on January 23, 1998, and 
held in the Weber County Jail through late February awaiting trial (R.92: 3). While 
incarcerated, defendant met John Garrard, who was housed in the same cell block for 
several days (R.92:8). Although Garrard and defendant had not previously met, 
defendant would stop by Garrard's cell to talk when defendant was let out of his cell 
and allowed to walk around the cell block for one or two hours each day (R.92:8-9). 
Defendant told Garrard that he was in jail on a murder charge, and 
discussed the facts of the murder with him (R.92:9). Defendant told Garrard that he 
and a friend, James Claude Carroll, had been in defendant's truck looking for rival 
gang members who owed defendant money from a drug deal (R.92:19,27, 29). 
Defendant described how he and Carroll had caught up to the rival gang at an Ogden 
gas station, but had been outnumbered and chased away (R.92:27). A car full of the 
rival gang members had then followed defendant and Carroll out of the gas station. As 
the rival car passed defendant's truck, defendant fired a handgun into the vehicle 
3 
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(R.92:9,29). Defendant told Garrard that one of the bullets fired by Carroll or him had 
hit someone in the other car in the back of the head (R.92:10,29). 
After describing the murder, defendant told Garrard he was worried that Carroll 
would testify against him and implicate him in the murder (R.92:10). Defendant asked 
Garrard how much it would cost to have Carroll killed (R.92:10, 24). Garrard told 
defendant to name a price, and defendant offered Garrard $1000 to kill Carroll 
(R.92:10-11). Defendant later told Garrard that he could not come up with $1,000, and 
asked if "a car and a couple of hundred would be good enough" (R.92:24). Defendant 
and Garrard discussed the arrangement several times a day for the next few days 
(R.92:12). The two arranged for Garrard to contact defendant when Garrard got out 
on bail (R.92:11). Defendant gave Garrard his phone number, name and gang name, 
and offered to provide Garrard with a pistol that he had hidden on his property in order 
to complete the murder (R.92:11-13). 
Garrard felt defendant was very serious about the murder, and that it would have 
happened with or without his involvement. Garrard believed defendant was an angry 
and dangerous man (R.92:13-14, 31). 
Garrard reported defendant's murder solicitation to the police (R.92:14-16). 
Detectives Chad Ledford and Steve Zachardy of the Ogden Police Department arranged 
for Garrard to call defendant while they listened in on the conversation (R.92:15-18). 
4 
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When Garrard asked defendant about the proposed murder of Carroll, defendant stated 
that "it had already been taken care of" (R.92:18). 
Defendant was arrested for solicitation (R.92:38-39). Although defendant had 
earlier denied he had talked to anyone about killing Carroll, when confronted with the 
tape, he asserted that Garrard had approached him about the murder (R.92:41, 48). 
Based upon his belief that there was a substantial risk of conviction, defendant 
pleaded guilty to a solicitation of murder charge without admitting the elements of the 
crime, as allowed under North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) (R.91:6-7). 
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court found that defendant's crimes were 
both "serious" and "involved violence" (R.93:ll) (Addendum A). The trial court also 
found that defendant was still "in denial of this [crime] notwithstanding his plea of 
guilty" (R.93:12). The court felt this raised "a question in the Court's mind about how 
conducive [defendant] would be to supervision in a less restrictive setting" (R.93:ll). 
The court found mitigating circumstances not mentioned in the presentence report, 
including that defendant is "developmentally slow" and does not see "accurately some 
of the consequences of his acts"(R.93:12). 
The trial court considered the factors listed in section 76-3-401(4) in deciding 
whether a consecutive sentence should be imposed, including the gravity and 
circumstances of the crime (a "very serious charge") and defendant's rehabilitative 
needs, and ordered that defendant's sentence on the murder solicitation charge run 
5 
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consecutively with his murder sentence (R.93:12). The court found that given the 
nature of the offense, the consecutive sentence was not "oppressive or unreasonable" 
(R.93:12). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering that defendant's sentence 
for solicitation of murder run consecutively to his prior murder sentence. Consecutive 
sentencing is authorized by Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401, and the court properly 
considered the factors listed in section 76-3-401 as relevant to the determination t; 
whether to impose a consecutive sentence. Defendant's presentence report has not been 
made a part of the record on appeal, and the trial court's balancing of the various 
factors relevant to sentencing therefore cannot be reviewed by this Court on appeal. 
In addition, the nature of the crime, solicitation to murder a potential witness in 
defendant's murder case, makes consecutive sentencing especially appropriate, in that a 
consecutive sentence is necessary to provide a deterrent. Defendant's refusal 
to acknowledge his guilt also supports the court's finding that consecutive sentencing is 
appropriate. 
Finally, the case law also supports the court's exercise of discretion in imposing 
a consecutive sentence, in that such sentences have only been reversed upon a showing 
that the consecutive sentences operated to remove any significant discretion from the 
Board of Pardons in monitoring a defendant's progress in prison. The sentence 
6 
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imposed in this case does not add significantly to the minimum sentence that defendant 
will serve. 
ARGUMENT 
POINTI 
THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WITHIN ITS DISCRETION TO 
SENTENCE DEFENDANT TO CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES 
CONSIDERING THE GRAVITY OF THE OFFENSE AND THE 
HISTORY, CHARACTER, AND REHABILITATIVE NEEDS OF 
THE DEFENDANT 
Defendant asserts that the trial court improperly imposed a consecutive sentence 
due to its failure to consider his potential to be rehabilitated and to take into account the 
significance of his Alford-type guilty plea, in which he refused to acknowledge his 
guilt. Brief of Appellant, pp.8-12. 
Standard of Review. This Court reviews a trial court's sentencing decisions for 
abuse of discretion. State v. Montoya, 929 P.2d 356, 359 (Utah App. 1996) (quoting 
State v. Houk, 906 P.2d 907, 909 (Utah App. 1995)). "Abuse of discretion 'may be 
manifest if the actions of the judge in sentencing were "inherently unfair" or if the 
judge imposed a "clearly excessive sentence."'" Houk, 906 P.2d at 909 (quoting State 
v. Wright, 893 P.2d 1113, 1120 (Utah App. 1995)). Additionally, "abuse of discretion 
results when the judge 'fails to consider all legally relevant factors' or if the sentence 
imposed is 'clearly excessive.'" State v. McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Utah 1990) 
(footnotes and citations omitted). This Court "may only find abuse of discretion 'if it 
7 
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can be said that no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court."' 
Houk, 906 P.2d at 909 {quoting Wright, 893 P.2d at 1120). 
Consecutive sentencing statute. When a defendant has been found guilty of 
multiple felonies, Utah law grants the trial court discretion to impose consecutive 
sentences. Utah Code Ann. §76-3-401(1) (1999) provides that "[a] court shall 
determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more than one felony offense, 
whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences for the offenses." The statute 
directs the trial court to "consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses and the 
history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant in determining whether to 
impose consecutive sentences." Utah Code Ann. §76-3-401(4) (1999). However, the 
statute requires only that the court consider these factors, not that it give them equal 
weight. See State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985) ("Although a sentencing 
judge will give considerable weight to the circumstances of the crime, a judge may also 
consider other factors."); State v. Nutall, 861 P.2d 454, 458 (Utah App. 1993) ("the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion by placing more emphasis on punishing defendant 
rather than rehabilitating him"). As such, "the exercise of discretion in sentencing 
necessarily reflects the personal judgment of the court," seeking to impose "a proper 
sentence based on the facts and law before it." State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 
(Utahl978). 
8 
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At defendant's sentencing hearing, the trial court properly considered the 
statutory factors, and found that the "gravity and circumstances of the offenses and the 
history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant" supported the imposition 
of consecutive sentences. The court's consideration and balancing of these factors was 
thorough and careful, and its ruling was not an abuse of discretion. 
The gravity and circumstances of the offenses. At the sentencing hearing, the 
trial court discussed the nature of defendant's crimes and found them to be grave and 
serious (R.93:12) (Addendum A). The first offense was a gang-related drive-by 
shooting and murder in which defendant opened fire on the passing vehicle of a rival 
gang member (R.92:9,27,29). The second offense was a solicitation to kill a witness to 
defendant's murder offense, with defendant asking a fellow inmate to kill the passenger 
in his truck during the murder because he was afraid the witness would testify against 
him(R.92:10). 
These separate crimes are both serious and warrant consecutive sentences. 
Noting that both crimes were violent, the trial court found that defendant's solicitation 
of a murder was especially serious under the circumstances: "the solicitation to kill a 
person who may be a witness in a homicide seems to the Court to be a very serious 
charge and it's one to which he pled guilty" (R.93:12). 
Indeed, the specific facts of this crime make consecutive sentences especially 
appropriate. While in custody for murder charges, defendant solicited the murder of a 
9 
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witness in his pending case. Imposition of consecutive sentences is the only way to 
deter such conduct because if, as in this case, a defendant anticipating a murder 
conviction were to only face a concurrent sentence for killing a witness in his case, 
there would not be any disincentive to making the attempt. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-
3-401(2) (1999) (creating a presumption in favor of consecutive sentences where a later 
offense is committed while defendant is imprisoned or on parole).1 
Instead of considering the serious nature of his crime, defendant simply criticizes 
the state's evidence, reciting a limited and skewed version of the facts.2 However, the
 J v 
nature of the state's evidence is not an issue at sentencing. Imposition of any sentence 
is based upon a finding that defendant is, in fact, guilty, and defendant's criticism of 
the state's evidence does not undercut the court's finding regarding the seriousness of 
the crime. 
1
 At sentencing, the prosecutor argued that the court should "send a message to 
other inmates who are sitting in the Weber County Jail that this county will not tolerate 
somebody making arrangements to kill a witness in a case." Defendant asserts that the 
court abused its discretion "by even considering" this argument (Brief of Appellant, p. 
12), but fails to explain why the prosecutor's statement is improper: deterrence of 
others is a proper sentencing consideration, and consecutive sentences are appropriate, 
even necessary to provide a deterrent under these circumstances. State v. Gardner, 947 
P.2d 630, 634 (Utah 1997) (traditional justifications for punishment include retribution, 
incapacitation, deterrence, and rehabilitation). 
2
 Defendant likewise argued his innocence to the trial court, prompting the 
prosecutor to describe at length the strong evidence of guilt which formed the basis for 
defendant's guilty plea (R.93:5-9). The trial court responded by simply noting that 
defendant had, in fact, pled guilty to the charge (R.93:12). 
10 
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Defendant's history, character, and rehabilitative needs. In sentencing 
defendant to consecutive terms, the court considered all of the information contained in 
defendant's presentence report, the accuracy of which is not challenged, and which has 
not been made a part of the record on appeal. In the absence of the report, the 
appellate court must assume that the information contained in the report would support 
the court's ruling. State v. Eloge, 762 P.2d 1, 2 (Utah 1988) ("defendant has not 
provided this Court with a copy of the presentence report, so there is nothing before 
this Court to determine whether the trial court's use of that report amounted to an abuse 
of discretion. Absent a record, this Court presumes regularity in the proceedings 
below."); State v. Nuttall, 861 P.2d 454, 458 n. 12 (Utah App. 1993) (appellate review 
of sentencing decision is limited when presentence report is not made a part of the 
record on appeal). 
Thus, defendant's assertion that the trial court "failed to consider his potential to 
be rehabilitated" (Brief of Appellant, p. 9) is unsupported by the record, and wrong. 
The record indicates that the court considered the information contained in defendant's 
presentence report, which defendant does not question on appeal. The court also 
considered the fact that a psychological evaluation had determined that defendant is 
"somewhat developmentally slow" (R.93:12). 
11 
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Given the facts of the case, the court properly found that defendant did not have 
a strong potential for rehabilitation, especially in light of defendant's refusal to 
acknowledge his guilt: 
The Court will make the following findings that this defendant has been 
convicted of a crime of homicide, murder, and while waiting trial on that 
charge commits another serious crime that also involved violence. It also, 
it will observe from the report that [defendant] appears to be in denial of 
this notwithstanding his plea of guilty. Therefore, [it] raises a question in 
the Court's mind about how conducive he would be to supervision in a 
less restrictive setting. 
Sentencing Hearing Transcript, p. 11-12 (R.93:ll-12). n 
Defendant also asserts in his brief that he has no prior record of violent crimes 
(aside, presumably, from his murder conviction). Brief of Appellant, p. 11. However, 
defendant does not cite to the record on appeal in support of this assertion, and there is 
thus no way to evaluate the nature of defendant's past criminal record. As noted 
above, the nature of defendant's background as described in the presentence report is 
not subject to review in the absence of a proper record. Further, consecutive 
sentencing may be appropriate even where the defendant had no prior violent crimes on 
his record. State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649, 652 (Utah App. 1997) (consecutive 
sentences appropriate for defendant without violent criminal history; defendant was 
unable to show that court did not consider this factor in sentencing). 
Effect of defendant's Alford plea. Defendant makes no argument that would 
diminish the seriousness of his crimes, instead claiming that the court improperly failed 
12 
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to consider the fact that defendant still claims to be innocent. "The Court failed to take 
into account that the plea of guilty was in the nature of an Alford plea . . . . At no time 
did the Appellant admit there was a factual basis for his plea." Brief of Appellant, p. 
8. An Alford plea is taken when a court accepts a defendant's guilty plea even though 
the defendant refuses to make an admission of guilt: 
While typically guilty pleas "consist of both a waiver of trial and an 
express admission of guilt," Alford pleas are ones in which a defendant 
"voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consents to the imposition 
of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his 
participation in the acts constituting the crime." 
State v. Stilling, 856 P.2d at 672 (quoting Alford, 400 U.S. at 37). 
Defendant complains that the court failed to acknowledge the significance of his 
Alford plea, as if this were a factor to be considered in his favor. Brief of Appellant, p. 
8-9. To the contrary, the trial court properly found that defendant's refusal to 
acknowledge his guilt shows a lower likelihood of rehabilitation and a need for a more 
restrictive sentence. Compare State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 938 (Utah 1998) (the fact 
that defendant confessed "and admitted responsibility for the crimes he committed" 
reflected positively on his character and weighed against consecutive sentencing). 
In sum, under these facts, the trial court's decision to run defendant's sentences 
consecutively was not an abuse of discretion. The court considered all of the relevant 
factors in imposing the consecutive sentence and defendant has failed to show that no 
reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court. See Schweitzer, 943 
13 
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P.2d at 652-53 ("because the length and consecutive nature of the terms are within the 
statutory parameters, we cannot say that defendant's consecutive prison and jail terms 
are either unfair or unnecessarily harsh"). Ultimately, since the presentence report has 
not been included in the record on appeal, there is no basis for this court to consider 
whether the trial court reasonably balanced the factors it considered in sentencing 
defendant. Eloge, 762 P.2d at 2. 
Case law. Defendant cites to two cases where appellate courts have reversed a 
trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences: State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236 (Utah 
1995), and State v. Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1993). The rulings in both of these 
cases were based upon an issue which is not raised in this case: extremely long 
consecutive sentences that essentially removed all discretion from the Board of 
Pardons. 
In Smith, the sentencing court stacked four 15-year minimum mandatory terms, 
resulting in a sixty-year sentence without possibility of parole. Smith, 909 P.2d at 244. 
In a ruling "limited to the facts of this case," the Utah Supreme Court held "it 
unreasonable and an abuse of discretion to have imposed essentially a minimum 
mandatory life sentence and thereby deprive the Board of Pardons of discretion to take 
into account defendant's future conduct and possible progress toward rehabilitation." 
Id. at245. 
14 
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In Strunk, a 16-year-old defendant pled guilty to first degree murder, child 
kidnaping, and aggravated sexual abuse of a child. Strunk, 846 P.2d at 1299. He 
received a life sentence on the first degree murder, and consecutive minimum 
mandatory sentences of 15 years for the child kidnaping and nine years for the 
aggravated sexual assault of a child. Id. at 1299, 1301. The court remanded the case 
because "the trial court abused its discretion in failing to sufficiently consider 
defendant's rehabilitative needs in light of his extreme youth and the absence of prior 
violent crimes." Id. at 1302. 
The court went on to address Strunk's sentence. "By ordering Strunk's 
minimum sentences . . . to run consecutive to each other, the trial court assured that 
Strunk would spend a minimum of twenty-four years in prison before being eligible for 
parole." Id. at 1301. The Court noted, "While imprisonment for that period of time, 
or even longer, may prove to be necessary and appropriate, the twenty-four-year term 
robs the Board of Pardons of any flexibility to parole Strunk sooner." Id. 
Accordingly, the court directed that "if on remand the trial court again imposes the 
longest minimum mandatory terms for these two offenses, all three terms should be 
ordered to run concurrently to afford the Board of Pardons the flexibility to adjust 
Strunk's prison stay to match his progress in rehabilitation and preparation to return to 
society." Id. at 1302. 
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Strunk and Smith are best understood as departures from the general rule that 
consecutive sentences are within the trial court's discretion, and were based on a 
finding that the trial court acted to prevent the Board of Pardons from exercising any 
discretion over the term of the sentence in light of defendant's later progress. In this 
case, the imposition of consecutive sentences does not significantly alter the Board of 
Pardon's ability to monitor defendant's rehabilitation and adjust his sentence r 
accordingly. Defendant's sentence for murder is for 5 years to life (R.93:2). 
Defendant's sentence for solicitation to commit murder is for 1-15 years (R.93:12). .Z. 
The Boards of Pardons therefore retains wide discretion to release defendant from 
prison only one year later than they would if the sentences were ordered to run 
consecutively. Indeed, under Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-9(l)(b) (Supp. 1998), the Board 
may release defendant even before the minimum term has been served if mitigating 
circumstances justify the release. Foote v. Utah Board of Pardons and Parole, 808 
P.2d 734, 735 (Utah 1991) (The Board of Pardons has the "unfettered discretion" to 
release defendant after any minimum period of the indeterminate sentence); see also 
Schweitzer, 943 P.2d at 652 (Strunk and Smith rulings were based upon infringement of 
the Board of Pardons' duty to monitor defendant's progress). 
Accordingly, the concerns underlying the decisions in Strunk and Smith are not 
present in this case, and the court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the 
consecutive sentences. See Smith, 909 P.2d at 245 ("We do not mean to imply by this 
16 
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ruling that consecutive sentences are never appropriate."); State v. J olivet, 111 P. 2d 
843, 844 (Utah 1986) ("Having determined that the consecutive sentences are 
statutorily permissible, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in their 
imposition in this case."). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should affirm defendant's 
consecutive sentence. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _ $ _ day of December, 1999. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
SCOTT KEITH WILSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellee 
was mailed first class mailed, postage prepaid, to Maurice Richards, PUBLIC 
DEFENDERS ASSOCIATION, INC. OF WEBER COUNTY, 2568 Washington 
Blvd., Suite 102, Ogden, UT 84401, this J^_ day of December 1999. 
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1 March 25, 1999 
2 HONORABLE MICHAEL D. LYON PRESIDING 
3 P R O C E E D I N G S 
4 THE COURT: State versus Enrique Coria. Mr. 
5 Perkins, I am in receipt of your letter as well as your 
6 critique of the pre-sentence report so I understand —\ 
7 MR. PERKINS: This is what I prepared and 
8 (inaudible) attached to this one so that's why I did that. 
9 I didn't get the pre-sentence report until yesterday when 
10 I, cause I didn't want to come again if it wasn't ready so 
11 I called over and spoke to your clerk and she indicated 
12 that they had one. So, I came over and got a copy. Then I 
13 immediately included the same things that I had included in 
14 Judge Dutson's Court. 
15 THE COURT: Okay. 
16 MS. BEATON: The State didn't get a copy of 
17 whatever you're referring to. 
18 THE COURT: Well, it's a response to the 
19 presentence of this issue. And you did not get a copy of 
20 that? 
21 MR. PERKINS: It's the same one that you've got 
22 from Judge Dutson's Court. 
23 MS. BEATON: I don't recall getting one in Judge 
24 Dutson's Court. What's the objection to it. 
25 MR. PERKINS: No, no. It was the response to the 
1 
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presentence investigation and it had all the letters with 
it. Were you, you were there in sentencing, weren't you? 
MS. BEATON: Yeah, I had a look at that. Yeah, I 
have. 
MR. PERKINS: I was going to say, you've had that 
for months. 
THE COURT: Do you have any other brief statement 
you'd make before sentencing? 
MR. PERKINS: Your Honor, I would. My brief 
statement would go to the fact that in this particular 
instance Mr. Coria was awaiting getting the finalization 
for bail when this instant was alleged to occur. The Court 
will recall after he was convicted of homicide we came 
here, we plead no contest under an Alford plea because of 
the fact that he'd already been convicted of murder of 
second degree, a second degree murder, first degree felony 
and was facing five to life so, I think that's somewhat 
laid out in my letter but I wanted to remind the Court 
because part of the response from the probation officer in 
Salt Lake that went and did this report, Mr. Coria 
indicates to me he talked to that individual for maybe five 
minutes when he came and saw him down in prison. So, he 
really didn't have much time to see Mr. Coria and get a 
feel for him. Nor do I think that they had any of the 
other information that I had furnished and had been 
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1 furnished for the presentence report that was initially 
2 prepared here in Ogden which included the psychological 
3 evaluations done by Dr. Berger, Dr. Berger and the 
4 sociology, the sociological report done by Mr. Beesley in 
5 this regard. 
6 The other thing that the Court should be aware i 
7 that when Mr. Coria was charged with this a day after the 
8 preliminary hearing he was then taken into custody when he 
9 was out on bail. So he's served about nine or ten months 
10 in jail because this charge making him felony on a felony 
11 because he already posted bail relative to the homicide. 
12 My view in this particular case is because when 
13 you're talking about the only testimony was from the 
14 individual John Gerrard at the preliminary hearing, his 
15 testimony was the first time he ever meets Mr. Coria and 
16 Mr. Coria is soliciting him to, you know, commit this 
17 homicide. Mr. Gerrard didn't know that James Carrol was 
18 his best friend and has been his best friend for two or 
19 three years prior to this time, that they hung out 
20 together. Always hung out together. He didn't know that. 
21 Obviously had he known that he might not have made those 
22 statements. The credibility was certainly at issue and it 
23 still remains an issue in my estimation and mind. Mr. 
24 Coria is sentenced and is serving a five to life at the 
25 present time for the homicide. He indicated to me today 
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that he's already involved in some programs at the prison. 
He's already involved in, it's called Conquest. And in 
that they have different areas and fields in which he'll be 
involved in including drug awareness, alcohol counseling, 
group setting, group therapy, orientation awareness, anger 
management, and he's not sure of all the areas in which 
he'll be in. Obviously this wasn't even known to the 
people preparing the presentence report so they're not, 
they're certainly not getting a very complete story as to 
what Mr. Coria is like. 
I make all of these representations to the Court 
because my view is that the sentence shouldn't even be 
concurrent or consecutive. My view is the fact that the 
way this case was postured Mr. Coria should be given credit 
for time served and this case ought to be terminated 
because he served about nine months for this particular 
offense because he wasn't entitled to bail at that point in 
time. So, in essence, it was for this particular offense. 
So, obviously, we think that that's more than enough for 
what the allegations were. And it's important to note that 
Mr. Coria never, ever did anything to follow up on. Matter 
of fact, what he did was he kind of told Gerrard the first 
time he called him after he was out, he ignores him, 
doesn't respond the second time he calls. He said, I've 
already taken care of it. Obviously, he wasn't meaning 
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that he'd done anything because Mr. Gerrard, nothing was 
ever done or attempted, excuse me, with Mr. Carroll, his 
friend. So, I think the nine months that he served is 
sufficient. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Do you wish to say 
anything, Mr. Coria? 
MR. CORIA: No. 
MS. BEATON: The State does. 
THE COURT: You may be heard. 
MS. BEATON: Thank you. You Honor, this feeling 
of Mr. Palmrey and I, who prosecuted both the murder and 
were assigned to this particular case, that the sentencing 
recommendation from Adult Probation and Parole is 
appropriate in this case, that this crime be sentenced 
consecutive to the murder case that he has. 
Mr. Perkins wants to talk about John Gerrard, the 
inmate who came and testified and unfortunately this Court 
did not get the opportunity to hear the preliminary 
hearing. But, nonetheless, Mr. Gerrard came down here and 
testified at both that preliminary hearing and at the 
actual murder trial to a variety of facts that he knew that 
were not public knowledge, that had not placed in the 
newspaper, or any other way that he could have found that 
information out but for the fact that he was talking to the 
defendant. And in addition to the defendant telling him a 
5 
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1 I great many details about the crime that he had committed, 
2 | he also indicates to him at that time that he would give 
3 I him $1,000 if he were willing to kill the other individual 
4 who was in the truck. 
5 Now, at some point in time Mr. Coria knew. This 
6 is a situation where this case goes unsolved essentially 
7 for almost a month's period of time because there were no 
8 witnesses. We have a group of individuals that come from 
9 Logan to the Weber County area and they've never seen the 
10 defendant, they don't know him personally or anything like 
11 that. And they end up getting shot at repeatedly by the 
12 defendant and then Mr. Carrol is riding along with the 
13 defendant. So, the defendant knows that this case is 
14 essentially based on the fact that he confesses and that 
15 Mr. Carrol is also in the car and he has also given a 
16 statement to Detective Ledford of the gang unit. 
17 So, the defendant in his own mind and according 
18 to John Gerrard told Detective Ledford that the defendant 
19 sees C.J. Carroll, the witness in this case, and the guy 
20 that's in the car with him, despite the fact that he's a 
21 friend of his, as an essential witness for the State and an 
22 essential witness in order to see that he's convicted on 
23 the murder case. Also, the defendant makes comments to 
24 John Gerrard, things about ballistics and how he didn't 
25 think that we would be able the ballistics that are found 
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1 in the victims head as compared to the gun that was 
2 recovered that the defendant had the night that he was 
3 arrested and those sorts of things. Thereby making him 
4 even more of a necessary witness in the State's case. 
5 There was also some indication, after speaking 
6 with Mr. Carroll, the witness in the case, that the 
7 defendant may, in fact, have been upset because he was also 
8 not charged in this crime. There was an incident 
9 apparently where the defendant, after he was bailed out, 
10 went over to Mr. Carroll's home and was mad and engaged in 
11 some sort of angry display there, ripping up pictures and 
12 that sort of thing. Was angry because he also wasn't 
13 charged. And, in fact, there were two different guns in 
14 the car and two different guns were fired on that night. 
15 Now, the defendant admitted that at one point, he's 
16 questioned first and he admits to using both of the guns at 
17 some point in that night. 
18 Mr. Carroll indicates he never was involved in 
19 any of the guns, although from what it was looking like in 
20 the defendant's reaction it may have been possible that Mr. 
21 Carroll may have been using one of the two guns, as well. 
22 But we do think the gun that shot the victim was the one 
23 that the defendant used because that's what the defendant 
24 told us. 
25 Also, in addition to Mr. Gerrard, if we're to 
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1 comment, obviously we're not here for trial but if we're 
2 going to comment on Mr, Gerrard as a witness just in 
3 general because I do agree with Mr. Perkins assessment. 
4 This was a case where an inmate contacts Detective Ledford. 
5 He, in fact, contacts his attorney, Mr. Miles, who then in 
6 turn contacts Mr. Saunders from our office, who, then in 
7 turn, we then make arrangements for him to go talk to 
8 Detective Ledford. But Mr. Gerrard, when he's doing this, 
9 is doing this as some risk to himself. I mean he was 
10 obviously concerned both of the two times that he testified 
11 because he's in the Utah State prison himself and he knew 
12 he was going to go to the Utah State prison. So, he's 
13 risking his life essentially by coming and testifying on 
14 two occasions. There was nothing in it for him. He was 
15 not given any kind of concession on the charges he 
16 currently had pending while he was in the Weber County jail 
17 from the State of Utah in exchange for his testimony 
18 against this defendant and he has not since been given any 
19 sort of consideration for it and never, in fact, asked for 
20 any consideration for it. 
21 Spoke with Detective Ledford on at least two or 
22 three different occasions. Actually was willing to 
23 participate in a monitored call in which he did speak with 
24 the defendant on two different occasions and did all of 
25 this without requesting anything in exchange from the 
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1 State. No leniency on his charges, no intervention at the 
2 Board of Pardons or anything for himself. And essentially 
3 the reason he said that he came forward was because this 
4 guy is talking about killing another person while he's 
5 sitting in the Weber County jail awaiting trial on a murder 
6 case. 
7 Now, as far as the time that he has served while 
8 he was in and he did get, he actually did bail out at one 
9 point in time on a property bond. He then did come back in 
10 on felony, on felony status. It was the felony on felony 
11 status which made non-bailable at that point in time but 
12 the State is prepared to concede that he should be 
13 receiving credit for time served, I believe he'd received 
14 credit for time served in the murder case though and it 
15 doesn't seem necessary that he receive credit for time 
16 served on each of the two crimes. 
17 In addition, your Honor, this is a situation 
18 where somebody is awaiting trial on a murder case and in 
19 order for the State to put forth cases in this county and 
20 in this State, it is necessary that we have witnesses who 
21 are available to testify. And essentially what the 
22 defendant was willing to do was to snub out an essential 
23 witness or a witness that we thought would be essential 
24 originally when the case was filed, to snub that witness 
25 out prior to actually going to trial so he could somehow 
9 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 prevent us from actually going to trial and putting this 
2 case to the Court. 
3 The State's position is is that the Defendant 
4 did, one, and has been convicted of the murder charge, and, 
5 two, has now admitted to this solicitation type charge. 
6 Both of these incidents are very serious and both of these 
7 deserve that the defendant receive an appropriate 
8 punishment. And essentially, also, to send a message to 
9 other inmates who are sitting in the Weber County Jail that 
10 this county will not tolerate somebody making arrangements 
11 to kill a witness in a case. It is the State's position 
12 that his sentence should be consecutive to the murder case. 
13 MR. PERKINS: Your Honor, if I may respond. 
14 THE COURT: Briefly. 
15 MR. PERKINS: Thank you, your Honor. Your Honor, 
16 I think that it's obviously a situation for a concurrent. 
17 We're talking about, the only reason it's presumptively 
18 concurrent unless there is a showing that of non-
19 rehabilitation type of aspects and all that. Those aren't 
20 addressed. Those weren't addressed, either in the 
21 presentence report done in Judge Dutson's Court nor in this 
22 second report. This second report, I don't know, if we 
23 knew it was going to be like that we could have done it 
24 three months ago as far as the information that it 
25 supplied. 
10 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Obviously, Ms. Beaton and I have a much different 
view as far as Mr. Gerrard is concerned, what he said and 
how it (inaudible). But the point is, the State charged 
this as a soliciting, not as a conspiracy because they 
never had any overt acts and they knew they couldn't ever 
establish any overt acts. They're talking about this one 
jailhouse confession at best as being the foundation for 
this charge which obviously people in jail say all kinds of 
things. 
Mr. Coria, as I indicated in my response to the 
Court, Gerrard brings up the subject and Mr. Coria just 
says that's what he did. I never wanted to kill my friend 
and he still doesn't. Never has. Never did anything to do 
it. So, that's our position, your Honor. We are prepared 
for sentencing. I would indicate that relative to the 
other charge he does have a prison assessment already 
that's given of 18 years so that's where that stand 
relative to active prison at this particular time. 
THE COURT: The Court will make this observation 
that he did plead guilty to a criminal solicitation. The 
Court will make the following findings that this defendant 
has been convicted of a crime of homicide, murder, and 
while waiting trial on that charge commits another serious 
crime that also involved violence. It also, it will 
observe from the report that appears to be in denial of 
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this notwithstanding his plea of guilty. Therefore, raises 
a question in the Court's mind about how conducive he would 
be to supervision in a less restrictive setting. The Court 
further finds that subsequent to his arrest he then commits 
another serious grave crime. 
The pre-sentence report does not address any 
mitigating circumstances but the Court will make this 
finding based on Dr. Beasley's report that was submitted to 
the Court that he does appear to the Court to be somewhat 
developmentally slow, perhaps has the equivalent mental 
development of a twelve to fourteen year old and sometimes 
does not see the, accurately some of the consequences of 
his acts. 
This Court has balanced all of these 
considerations and since, also what Ms. Beaton has observed 
that the solicitation to kill a person who may be a witness 
in a homicide seems to the Court to be a very serious 
charge-and it's one to which he plead guilty. Having 
regard, therefore, for his potential to be rehabilitated, 
having regard for the severity of all of these aggravating 
circumstances, the Court sentences the defendant to serve a 
prison term of one to fifteen years and I will order that 
that be served consecutively. It strikes the Court that 
given the nature of this offense that does not prove to the 
Court to be oppressive or unreasonable. And I'm doing that 
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also mindful that he's already down there five years to 
life but my guess is that they could keep him as long as 
they wanted to but they will also take a look at this 
sentence and recognize that in the Court's judgment, and 
they look to what the trial judge is recommending, this 
Court is concerned about this conduct and this case on the 
heels of a very serious crime. 
You have thirty days in which to file an appeal 
of this size. 
MR. PERKINS: Thank you, your Honor. 
(Whereupon the sentencing was concluded. 
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